Does a 50‑Foot Easement Automatically Give You 50 Feet of Absolute Control?
On April 9, 2026, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Thibault Enterprises, LLC v. Yost[1], a dispute involving a 50-foot easement, a gravel road, grapevines, hay bales, and fencing, which the Court used to clarify an important rule about easements in Virginia.
If an easement says it is 50 feet wide, can the easement holder demand that all 50 feet stay completely clear of anything placed there by the landowner? The answer is no, at least not automatically. The real question is whether the landowner's use unreasonably interferes with the purpose of the easement.
To refresh, an easement is a privilege that allows one party who owns real property (called the dominant estate), to use the land of another party (called the servient estate) in a particular manner and for a particular purpose[2].
What Happened in Thibault v. Yost
The Yost Living Trust owns 1.08 acres in Dinwiddie County, where David and Caryn Yost live[3]. The Yosts hold an easement granting them, in the deed's exact words, "the right of ingress and egress over an outlet road, fifty (50) feet in width," running from their property to State Route 601[4]. The gravel road they use is approximately 12 feet wide and sits within that 50‑foot easement area[5].
Remember that: the stated purpose is ingress and egress over an outlet road. The 50-foot width describes the geometry, but the deed's operative language is about coming and going, a detail the Court would later find decisive.
Thibault Enterprises, LLC owns the land on which the easement runs and uses the property for agricultural purposes. Thibault placed fences with grapevines, fence poles, hay bales, and trees within the boundaries of the 50-foot easement, but to the side of the gravel road, not in the road itself. The parties also stipulated that some trees were within the easement[6].
None of these objects prevented or materially interfered with the Yosts' ability to travel the gravel road to reach their home. In fact, the Yosts acknowledged that their ingress and egress was "by and large not hampered”[7].
Despite that, the Yosts filed suit alleging nuisance.
They sought an injunction preventing Thibault from placing anything within the 50-foot easement area. Their position was simple: the easement said 50 feet, so they wanted all 50 feet kept clear[8]. The Dinwiddie Circuit Court and Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed with the Yosts, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed[9].
The Court framed the issue this way: when an easement describes a specific width, can the easement holder forbid the landowner from placing anything within that width? Or should a court ask whether the object unreasonably interferes with the purpose of the easement?
The Supreme Court chose the second approach, relying on a century worth of precedent:
- In Piney Meeting House v. Hart, the Court rejected the argument that every encroachment is material whenever an easement has an express width, explaining that a servient owner may make reasonable use of land burdened by an easement of defined width[10].
- In Willing v. Booker, the Court recognized that the owner of the soil may use the land so long as that use does not interfere with the reasonable use of the right of way and stated plainly that "the test is reasonableness”[11]. Because the fence at issue in Willing did not impede the easement holder's ingress or egress, the Court sided with the servient landowner.
- In Walton v. Capital Land, Inc., the Court reiterated that the servient owner retains the right to use the land in any manner that does not unreasonably interfere with the use granted in the easement[12].
The Court then distinguished cases involving more serious interference.
- In Pizzarelle v. Dempsey, the deed contained unusually strong language, as it prohibited any act that would "in any manner affect or jeopardize the free and continuous enjoyment" of the easement. The servient estate owner built a fence that reduced the easement by five to six feet and blocked all ingress and egress on one side of the easement. The Court opined that if injunctive relief were denied, a significant portion of the 24-foot easement was rendered unusable[13]. That combination of facts and deed language compelled injunctive relief.
- In Snead v. C&S Properties Holding Co., the Court held that the servient owner materially encroached on an express 60-foot ingress and egress easement by installing a fence and other improvements that prevented use of approximately two-thirds of its width. These facts compelled injunctive relief because the facts established substantial interference with ingress and egress, not because every defined-width encroachment is automatically unlawful[14].
The Court also addressed Virginia Code § 55.1-305, which provides that, unless the easement says otherwise, the servient owner may not place objects or engage in activity that unreasonably interferes with enjoyment of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate[15]. The Court emphasized that reasonableness language and held that the statute does not require removal of every object from a right-of-way easement merely because the easement has a stated width[16].
The principle that emerges from Thibault is that courts reviewing claimed encroachments on easements should first examine the deed language to determine the purpose of the easement and the intent of the parties. They should then evaluate whether the servient owner’s actions unreasonably interfere with that purpose[17].
With that in mind: here, the deed granted the Yosts “the right of ingress and egress over an outlet road, fifty (50) feet in width, running from the southwestern corner of the [Yosts’ property] to State Route #601.” Thus, the purpose of the easement was to allow the Yosts to enter and exit their property and reach State Route 601.
The Court found that the evidence unequivocally showed the Yosts could do exactly that[18]. The fences, vines, hay bales, and other items Thibault placed beside the gravel road did not interfere with that use in any appreciable way. Therefore, Thibault’s actions did not unreasonably interfere with the easement’s purpose, and there was no basis to require removal of the items beside the gravel road.
Two Items the Court Left Open
First, the Yosts worried that their easement could eventually be extinguished by prescription if Thibault was not required to remove the objects. Think of prescriptive easements like a shortcut through your backyard: if your neighbor cuts through every day and you never say anything, eventually, they’ve been doing it so long that it becomes their right, and you’ve lost the ability to stop them. The same logic concerned the Yosts in reverse.
The Court did not resolve that issue, but it cited persuasive authority suggesting that a prescriptive easement requires the servient owner’s use to be clearly wrongful, incompatible, or irreconcilable with the easement holder’s rights before the prescriptive period begins[19]. Thibault’s use of the Yosts’ easement was none of those.
Second, the Court recognized that changed circumstances could require a different answer. If traffic increased along the gravel road or erosion made the existing road inadequate, use of the full easement width might become necessary. The current 12-foot gravel road may not always be enough for the Yosts, but on this record, they could use the road for the purpose granted in the easement, and the items beside the road did not unreasonably interfere with that use[20].
Encroachments: Reasonableness Standard Rather Than Absolute Prohibition
Although Thibault arose from a private dispute over a gravel road, its reasoning may have practical implications for easements used in public infrastructure projects. Unless the easement instrument or governing law provides otherwise, the analysis will turn on the language of the easement, the purpose for which it was granted, and whether the alleged encroachment unreasonably interferes with that purpose.
If you think you have or may need an easement, right of way, or private road maintenance agreement, the experienced attorneys in Pender & Coward’s Eminent Domain / Right of Way Practice Group can help you. Pender & Coward represents state agencies, municipalities, transit authorities, utilities and right‑of‑way consultants in the acquisition of right‑of‑way and other property for infrastructure projects.
Marcus K. Mitchell focuses his practice on family law, eminent domain and right of way condemnation matters for government and business entities, misdemeanor criminal defense matters, and traffic law matters. He has also been recognized among Virginia’s Legal Elite and Coastal Virginia’s Top Lawyers.
[1] Thibault Enters., LLC v. Yost, Record No. 250128 (Va. Apr. 9, 2026)
[2] See, e.g., Garner v. Joseph, 300 Va. 344, 351 (2021); Stoney Creek Resort, Inc. v. Newman, 240 Va. 461, 464 (1990); Brown v. Haley, 233 Va. 210, 216 (1987)
[3] Thibault, slip op. at 1
[4] Id. at 2
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 1, 2, 8-9
[10] Piney Meeting House v. Hart, 284 Va. 187, 194 (2012)
[11] Willing v. Booker, 160 Va. 461, 466 (1933)
[12] Walton v. Capital Land, Inc., 252 Va. 324, 326 (1996)
[13] Pizzarelle v. Dempsey, 259 Va. 521, 524-31 (2000)
[14] Snead v. C&S Props. Holding Co., 279 Va. 607, 610–16 (2010)
[15] Va. Code Ann. § 55.1-305
[16] Thibault, slip op. at 6-8
[17] Id. at 8
[18] Id. at 7-8
[19] Id. at 8 (citing Powell on Real Property § 34.21 for the proposition that a servient tenant’s adverse use must be clearly wrongful or irreconcilable with the easement before prescription begins).
[20] Id. at 8.
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